Foreign banks play a large role in the loan sales market. We examine this role using individual bank data on foreign-owned banks in the United States. We find that the motives for loan sales and purchases differ between U.S. and foreign-owned banks and between foreign banks of different regions. The evidence is consistent with foreign banks' using the market for diversification.
I. Introduction
Amidst the trade in traditional goods, such as autos, rice, and Euroyen futures, nations along the Pacific Rim also trade an asset that quietly challenges banking everywhere: loans. Increasingly, banks of all sizes are selling their commercial and industrial loans. These sales take place without guarantees from the U.S. government or from the selling bank, and without being bundled into securities. The effect is that loans are removed both from the U.S. market and from the world banking system at large. The extensive trade in what once was thought a closely held asset confronts bank managers, regulators, and policymakers with the need to rethink the role banks play in the economy and the role government plays in the banking sector.'
To fully comprehend the loan sales market and its implications for financial intermediation, we need to understand the international side of the question. Large banks surveyed by the Federal Reserve in 1993 indicated that more than 85 percent of their loan sales went to foreign banks or to U. S. branches and agencies of foreign banks. With foreign banks approaching a dominant stance in the loan sales market, recognizing this force is key to understanding market,pressures and the effect of regulations --the need to diversifjr, binding capital requirements, or a shift in regional economies --on the loan sales market. This, in turn, is a step toward understanding the basic institutional and technological changes that have allowed loan sales to become a feasible contract, and thus a suitable solution for these problems.
The loan sales market is also important in assessing the true position of international banks. Terrell(1993) reports that at the end of 199 1 :IQ, U. S. branches and agencies of foreign banks held $143.7 billion of commercial and industrial (C&I) loans to U.S. companies. Offshore branches of foreign banks held another $78.7 billion. All told, foreign banks held 32.8 percent of the U.S. C&I loan market. McCauley and Seth (1992) suggest that foreign bank penetration
The loan sales market may also be the key for reconciling the results of studies that suggest banking is a declining industry, such as Gorton and Rosen (1992) , with studies that suggest banking is still viable, such as Boyd and Gertler (1 994).
of the U.S. C&I loan market is even higher, possibly as much as 45 percent of the total market at the end of 199 1. These estimates, however, miss the distinction between loans held and loans originated and thereby overstate the foreign-bank involvement.
Operationally, because of data limitations we must approach international trade in loans in a roundabout manner. Using the available U.S. data, we examine how foreign-owned banks differ in their loan sales activity and how foreign conditions influence the market. By characterizing the determinants of loan sales and purchases, we hope to distinguish the important influences and motives for different types of banks. We use the individual bank data from the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council's (FFIEC) Quarterly Reports of Condition and Income (call reports) to estimate the determinants of loan sales and purchases.
The sample period includes the recent recession and downturn in the loan sales market and thus provides an opportunity to take a deeper look at these issues.
Our work builds on previous studies by Haubrich and Thomson (1 993) and Demsetz (1 993), once again using Tobit analysis. This explicitly takes into account the many banks that do not sell (or buy) loans without ignoring the information about the volume of those who do participate. Unfortunately, it also makes correcting for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation more difficult than for linear regression.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section describes the basic details of the loan sales market, along with a simple theory we use to organize our thoughts on the subject. Section 3, the heart of the paper, presents the empirical results. Conclusions and suggestions for future work appear in section 4.
The Loan Sales Market
A bank sells a loan by promising its payment stream to the buyer.2 In the most common type of loan sale (the participation), the original contract between the bank and the borrower stays in place, and the bank continues to collect payments, oversee the collateral, and examine the books. In many cases (termed silent participations), the borrower does not even know the loan has been sold.
Two legal and accounting issues shape the loan sales market: Banks want to remove the loan from their balance sheet and also desire to avoid federal securities laws. To take the loan off the balance sheet and treat the transaction like an asset sale rather than a borrowing, the bank must show that the risk of the loan has been shiRed to the buyer. This means the entire loan must be sold off, that the bank can provide no recourse to the buyer, and that the loan must be sold to maturity. (See Moms [1991] or Gorton and Haubrich [1990] for more detail.)
Banks sell several different types of loans. A newsletter, Asset Sales Report, tracks loan sales for nine major banks. As of January 25, 1993, the total balance outstanding for this group was $58 billion--$5 billion in loans under a year and $53 billion in loans with maturities one year or more. Maturity has increased as the market has developed. In the early 1980s, the banks mainly sold short-term (under 90 days) domestic commercial and industrial (C&I) loans made to investment-grade @BB or better) borrowers. Since then, maturity has lengthened and loans to lower-quality borrowers have predominated. Among large banks, the share of outstanding loans sold that were obligations to investment-grade borrowers had dropped to 37 percent by 1989. of loans sold and that foreign offices of foreign banks bought an additional 13 percent. Nonbank and even nonfinancial firms also buy loans, so that some loans leave the banking system entirely.
Loan purchases by foreign banks and nonbank firms limit the scope of our empirical results, which depend on the bank call reports, and so our results are restricted to domestic banks (and insured domestic offices of foreign banks).
Another aspect of this market is its pricing structure. Prices of highly rated loans closely track commercial paper and the London interbank offered rate (LEIOR). Not surprisingly, yields on lower-rated loans show a greater spread. The August 2, 1993 issue of Asset Sales Report lists the spread between the 30-day Al/Pl loan sales yield and commercial paper as 0 basis points. At times, short-term loan sales even sell at a premium. For loans with a lower rating, A2/P2, the spread was 10 basis points.
. As a basic framework in which to think about the issues surrounding loan sales, we use a simplified version of the model developed by Pennacchi (1988) . This model is a statepreference version of the Miller (1977) debt model as extended to banks by Orgler and Taggart (1983) . Corporate income taxation gives a tax advantage to debt, but debt increases agency and bankruptcy costs, providing a determinate debt-to-equity ratio.
Apart from selling loans, banks have two sources of finds: deposits and equity.
Deposits have a tax advantage in that their interest is deductible as a business expense, but have an additional cost of reserve requirements. Banks have a constraint on these finding sources, namely a capital requirement that the ratio of debt (such as deposits) to equity not exceed a certain limit. Without loan sales, the bank makes loans until the return on the loan, net of monitoring costs, equals the cost of finds needed to find the loan. Loan sales introduce a new hnding possibility. The bank can now make a loan and sell a fraction of it. This sold fraction is removed from the bank's balance sheet and is, in effect, hnded by the loan buyer. Banks sell loans when they have a large supply of profitable loans relative to their knding and buy loans when they have a large supply of hnding relative to their loan opportunities. That is, for a bank with a low supply of cheap core deposits, loan sales represent an alternative to purchasing hnds in the competitive national deposit market.
A bank with a good supply of core deposits but with fewer profitable loan originations instead resorts to investing in the money market. Along with the Treasury bills, commercial paper, and bankers acceptances, some of the investment may go to loan purchases.
Empirical Results
Our goal in this section is to extend our earlier work on characterizing the determinants of loan sales and purchases--to find out what determines who buys, who sells, and for how much. Here, we take a closer look at foreign banks,, one of the issues left unresolved in our previous study. from 1989 to 1991. Foreign banks did not participate in this pattern, but did show tremendous growth in 1990. Also note the large difference between sales and purchases--indicating the many loans that flow from the U.S. banking system either overseas or to nonbanks.5 Figure 3 shows intriguing evidence of overseas influence on the market, in the similarity between loan sales and the Nikkei index. This suggests the possibility that over the past decade, Japanese banks were major demanders of loans, and that their purchases corresponded to the level of hidden reserves they possessed.6
Berger and Ude11(1992), Demsetz (1993) , and Haubrich and Thomson (1993) One popular explanation links the loan sales market with the mergers and acquisitions -(M&A) market. However, Haubrich and Thomson (1993) show that M&A volume was simply too small to account for the level of loan sales. Furthermore, the level of M&As cannot explain either the rise or fall of loan sales volume.
Unlike U.S. banks, Japanese banks are allowed to own equities. Stocks are recorded on the balance sheet at acquisition cost, not at market value. Therefore, capital gains and losses on the Japanese banks' stock portfolio are not reflected in book equity and represent a "hidden reserve." When the international risk-adjusted capital standards were adopted in 1988, Japanese banks were allowed to count 50 percent of the net unrecorded gains on their stock portfolios toward Tier 1 capital.
A. Call Report Data
The empirical work using the call reports runs the dependent variable, loan sales or loan purchases, against a set of independent variables that proxy for individual bank characteristics and market conditions. We first use the entire available sample for loan sales and purchases. We next use a more restricted time period for which we have data on off-balance-sheet items and on highly leveraged transactions. This gives us more explanatory variables but a shorter time frame. To provide a benchmark case, we first ran ordinary least squares. While the parameter estimates were all highly. significant, the ~2 is extremely low. This result is not so surprising, because many banks do not sell loans: Of the 488,000 observations, 301,000 had no loan sales.
In the interest of space those results are not reported here.
Econometrically correcting for the large number of zero observations for the dependent variable required the use of a limited dependent variable method. We use Tobit, instead of logit or probit, because we do not wish to ignore the information about the quantity of loans sold (or bought).7 Figure 6 shows the importance of this distinction. The variation in sales comes not from changes in the number of banks selling, but rather in the volume of loans sold by banks in the market. A greater percentage of foreign banks sell loans than the national average; however, the major increase in sales volume coincided with a major decrease in the percent selling.
Loan Sales
We estimate the model over the entire sample, a subsample restricted to domestic banks, and a foreign-controlled bank subsample. The full sample results are not significantly different, statistically or economically, from those of the domestic sample. Therefore, in the interest of For other interesting approaches, see Pave1 and Phillis (1987) and Berger and Udell (1992) . space they are not reported here. The interested reader is referred to Haubrich and Thomson (1993) for a detailed discussion of the model and the empirical results. Table 3 However, the negative coefficient on TTASS suggests that within a particular size class, the larger a bank becomes, the fewer loans it sells. In the foreign bank sample, the dummies indicate that large foreign banks sell relatively fewer loans than do smaller banks. Interestingly, however, the coefficient on total assets also reverses sign, so it appears that within a given size class, larger foreign banks do sell more.
Two other coefficients change sign. The Southeast dummy becomes negative and turns insignificant for foreign banks, as does the net interest margin. Haubrich and Thomson (1993) argue that high net interest margins indicate a bank with a good supply of profitable loan opportunities. Therefore, the positive and significant coefficient on the net interest margin for the domestic subsample suggests that a bank with good lending opportunities makes a lot of loans, some of which it sells and some of which it keeps on its balance sheet. On the other hand, the insignificant coefficient on NETIMARG supports the idea that foreign banks have somewhat different incentives to sell loans. Perhaps they sell loans to parents overseas, and the diversification factor predominates, making the relative supply and demand story less important.
The most striking change, though not involving a sign reversal, occurs on the coefficient for CAPRAT, the capital ratio. At a level of -0.024 for domestic banks, it attains -0.177 for the foreign banks, and the difference is significant at the 1 percent level. The negative and significant relationship between capital and loan sales is consistent with Pennacchi's (1988) theoretical model and with Haubrich and Thomson (1993) . A decrease in capital has a much larger effect on loan sales for foreign banks. This may result from a greater concern with capital adequacy among foreign banks, but it also suggests that these banks use the loan sales market more aggressively to adjust their leverage. In addition, to the extent that foreign banks sell these loans to their overseas parent banks or to offshore international bank facilities, the significant effect of capita9 on loan sales is consistent with the use of this market to reallocate assets within the parent company in order to minimize fbnding costs (see McCauley and Seth [1992] ).
The distinctiveness of foreign banks is codinned by looking at the shorter period for which we have data on highly leveraged transactions, reported in table 5. The data for highly leveraged transactions exist only from 1991 :IQ to 1992:IIIQ. Two aspects of the HLT equations stand out. The coefficient on the capital ratio again becomes larger and economically more significant in the foreign bank equation. It likewise retains its negative sign in the HLT sample, unlike domestic banks, for which CAPRAT switches signs to positive in moving from the full sample to the HLT sample. Only foreign banks show a statistically significant coefficient on both new variables, HLTRAT and OFFRAT. The general importance of HLT activity most likely represents a "merchant banking" stance of several banks, which engage in a variety of highly technical financial activities, including loan sales. More directly, because HLT loans are more apt to be sold, a large presence in the HLT market indicates a propensity to sell loans. The importance of OFFRAT in the foreign bank equation shows that for foreign banks, at least, these are conceptually different activities and suggests that foreign banks which pursue off-balancesheet activities more aggressively will also sell more loans.
Loan Purchases
The equations for loan purchases are estimated over a shorter sample period because data on purchases are not available until 1987:IIQ. Tobit analysis again is the appropriate estimation technique because most banks did not purchase loans, though foreign-controlled banks were more likely to have done so, as figure 7 indicates. Table 6 presents the expected and estimated signs for the loan purchase equation. Table   7 again splits the banks, with panel A reporting the Tobit purchase results for domestic banks, and panel B for foreign banks. Once again, notice that the foreign sample is much smaller and therefore less precisely estimated.
Except for some size dummies, the results for domestic banks look almost identical to those for the full sample. Therefore, the full sample results are not presented here (again, the interested reader is referred to Haubrich and Thomson for a detailed discussion of the model).
The results for the foreign banks are markedly different from the domestic bank results, especially in the capital and the market measures. CAPRAT changes sign, to positive, and is no longer statistically significant. The market variables, TSPRD and BAASPRD, also lose their significance. Once again, foreign banks respond differently to important motives in a way consistent with a more single-minded pursuit of diversification. In addition, their exposure to other markets may make our interest-rate proxy less relevant to their true problem.
The ratio of loan sales to assets (LSRAT) for foreign banks drops markedly in significance and its coefficient is considerably smaller, 0.073, than for the domestic bank sample (1.8 16). This probably reflects the larger size and greater involvement of foreign banks in trading activities. Another reason may be the use of loan purchases by foreign banks to build loan volume and market share.
The results for the HLT sample mirror most of these changes, as the shift in CAPRAT and the loss of significance of market variables in table 8 make clear. In addition, the charge-off ratio changes sign and becomes insignificant. For domestic banks, the negative charge-off coefficient clearly points to a "comparative advantage" explanation for loan purchases. Some banks excel at identieing and investing in loans; the positive coefficient on net loans and leases supports this. Foreign banks as a group, however, are probably not in this class. They may find it more difficult to acquire the expertise and, as mentioned before, the diversification motive may predominate, swamping the differences in relative ability. For the HLT variables themselves, even with the smaller sample size, the foreign bank equation shows significant coefficients for both off-balance-sheet volume and highly leveraged transactions.
B. Equity Influences
Earlier, figure 3 suggested a connection between loan sales and Japanese stock prices.
The connection makes sense, because stock prices affect the level of "hidden reserves" that augment the capital position of Japanese banks. With a strong capital position, the banks could lend to a great extent, putting them in the market for U.S. loans. As hidden reserves fall, bank lending declines, depressing the market for loans. Table 9 investigates this possibility a bit more systematically. It reports yet another Tobit regression, adding stock market indices for Japan, Hong Kong, Seoul, and Singapore. It also adds dummies for the home country of foreign-controlled banks in the United States--Britain, Canada, Latin America, Japan, other East Asia, and other Asia. Table 9 reports some intriguingly paradoxical results. Despite the large presence of the Japanese banks in the loan sales market, the dummy for Japan enters with a negative sign:
Everything else equal (which it isn't ), Japanese banks sell fewer loans. This is perhaps less of a paradox than it initially appears. It suggests that many countries do not repatriate loans directly fiom their U.S. affiliate, but buy them in the larger market. The split between the negative correlation of Japanese, European, and other East Asian banks and the positive correlation of Canadian and Latin American banks may bear this out, as the New World banks may find it easier to obtain the information necessary to originate loans in the United States. The other banks find it easier to buy loans originated by other banks.
Additional insight into the Japanese-owned bank results can be found in McCauley and Seth (1992) . In looking at the holdings of U.S. commercial loans by on-and offshore affiliates of foreign banks, these authors found that the Japanese banks held most of their U.S. corporate loans on the books of their onshore affiliates. Therefore, Japanese-owned banks in the United
States are less likely to use the loan sales market to transfer assets to offshore banking facilities than are other foreign bank subsidiaries. Clearly, offshore booking of C&I loans by foreign banks accounts for some of the difference between the volume of loans sold and purchased by domestically chartered banks in the United States.
Despite the apparent correlation of aggregate values in figure 3, loan sales on the individual bank level show a negative relation with the Nikkei index. Statistically, the coefficient is highly significant, but no general pattern emerges across the other indices. The message of clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfm figure 3, then, is debunked. The most likely explanation is that these market indices correlate with macroeconomic and trade variables that influence the level of loan sales.
Conclusion
Loan sales prefigure major changes in the role of banks as intermediaries. Fully comprehending this change requires understanding the forces driving the loan sales market. Foreign banks and their domestic branches play a distinctive role, which we analyze by looking at the determinants of loan sales and purchases.
This micro-level approach yields several insights missed by considering aggregate levels.
For example, despite the large presence of Japanese banks in the market, everything else equal, Japanese banks sell fewer of the loans than do domestic banks. Likewise, despite an impressive casual correlation between the Nikkei index and loan sales, on an individual bank level, the relation is actually negative.
Foreign banks often respond differently than do domestic banks to the determinants of loan sales and purchases. In some ways, most notably with respect to capital, they show themselves to be more sensitive than domestic banks. In other ways, such as charge-offs and bond market conditions, they show themselves to be less sensitive. It would make little sense to fit the many disparate results to a Procrustean bed, but the evidence broadly fits a consistent interpretation of the market. Foreign banks use loan sales as a diversification tool, perhaps having more to gain. This strategy makes them less sensitive to nuances that U.S. banks find more important, such as the term structure or their relative expertise in originating loans. The ratio of bank capital to total assets. The ratio of "hot" hnds to total assets, that is, deposits above $100,000, brokered deposits, foreign deposits, and Fed hnds purchased.
HOLDCO
A dummy variable that equals 1 if the bank is part of a holding company, 0 if it is not.
TTASS
The log of total assets.
CHRRAT
The ratio of total charge-offs net of recoveries (a measure of losses on loans) to total assets.
NLRAT
The ratio of net loans and leases to total assets.
1.WTIMARG The net interest margin of the bank: total interest income less total interest costs all divided by total assets.
TSPRD
The spread between 30-year Treasury bonds and 90-day Treasury bills at the beginning of each quarter.
BAASPRD The spread between Standard & Poor's Baa bond portfolio and 90-day Treasury bills.
OFFRAT
The ratio of off-balance-sheet activities, exclusive of loan sales, to total assets.
HLTRAT
The ratio of loans for highly leveraged transactions to total assets. 
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